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In the three decades since Congress
enacted the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, commonly known as the
Clean Water Act (Act), tremendous
progress has been made in water pollu-
tion prevention and control. As this
progress curtails certain water pollution
sources, previously overlooked sources
emerge as high priorities.  One such pre-
viously overlooked source of water pollu-
tion is stormwater.  Stormwater pollution
has emerged as one of the most egre-
gious, prevalent, and complex problems
in water pollution control.  At the time
this article was written, stormwater in the
United States had been cited as the
source of impairment of 34,871 miles of
rivers and streams, 7.7 million acres of
lakes, and 5,045 square miles of estuar-
ies.1 Although stormwater can come from
residential and municipal sources, the
focus of this article is industrial stormwa-
ter pollution.
This note begins by briefly describing
the evolution of stormwater regulation in
Building on Individual Strengths:
Achieving Greater Success in
Stormwater Pollution Prevention 
Through Collaboration
By Christine Chestnut
* Ms. Chestnut is a J.D. Candidate at University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, graduating in
2004. She received a B.S. degree in Environmental
Studies from the University of California, Santa Barbara
in 1999. She wishes to thank Professor Brian Gray of UC
Hastings for his inspiration and guidance. Many of the
themes and ideas in this note developed as a direct
result of a panel discussion held at Hastings on January
14, 2003. The panelists - Hugh Barroll, Shana Lazerow,
Don Reh, and Professor Cliff Rechtshaffen from Golden
Gate University School of Law - deserve recognition and
many thanks for their priceless contributions.
1.  G. Tracy Mehan III, Assistant Administrator for
Water, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Remarks before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife,
and Water of the Committee on Environmental and
Public Works, United States Senate (Sept. 16, 2003).
the United States and more specifically, in
California.  The roles of the three major
players in the current world of industrial
stormwater management are addressed,
followed by a discussion of how each
player’s strengths can be combined into a
collaborative process to increase efficien-
cy and effectiveness.
The discussion will then turn to two
major barriers to effective stormwater
enforcement: the lack of resources and
the perception of the process as unfair.
Analysis of these barriers is essential to
improving enforcement.  A collaborative
system will work only if the participants
have incentives to act collaboratively, and
these barriers deter rather than encourage
collaboration.  The analysis suggests that
a strict division of labor and the use of
industry groups will allocate resources
most effectively.  Adding numerical stan-
dards to California’s industrial permit,
adequately following up permit viola-
tions, and issuing permits to unpermitted
facilities will reduce uncertainties that
lead to perceptions of unfairness.
I. Introduction 
Congress enacted the Clean Water
Act in 1972 to improve water quality.2 The
Act addresses water pollution through the
regulation of point sources by water qual-
ity based effluent limitations set by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and by technology-based discharge man-
agement practices.  Since the Act’s incep-
tion, water quality in the United States
has greatly improved. However, stormwa-
ter runoff remains widely recognized as
the most intractable and egregious source
of industrial water pollution.
In 1987, Congress amended the Act
to address point source pollution from
stormwater runoff.3 With regulations in
place, enforcement of the regulations
became a major concern.  Three distinct
players have emerged: agencies, citizen
enforcement organizations, and industrial
dischargers.  Each player possesses spe-
cific strengths.  These strengths are insuf-
ficiently emphasized in the current sys-
tem, with each player striving to tackle
multiple aspects of stormwater pollution
enforcement while operating within the
constraints of finite resources.  Thus, the
situation is ripe for the development of a
collaborative stormwater management
effort.
II. The Clean Water Act
Congress enacted the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, commonly referred
to as the Clean Water Act, on October 22,
1972.4 The Act embodied the new environ-
mental awareness emerging in the United
States as a result of such events as the
massive oil spill off the Santa Barbara
coast, the release of Rachel Carson’s
shocking expose Silent Spring, and the first
Earth Day.
Previous water pollution regulations
relied on ambient water quality stan-
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2.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act (here-
inafter the Clean Water Act in footnotes) § 101 et
seq., § 1251 et seq. (2003).
3.  Id.
4.  See Michael Lozeau, Tailoring Citizen
Enforcement to an Expanding Clean Water Act: The
San Francisco BayKeeper Model, 28 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 429, (1998) for a comprehensive look at the
evolution of Clean Water Act enforcement and the
emergence of stormwater enforcement.
dards.5 However, this process of regulating
individual dischargers under general stan-
dards was burdensome and inefficient.6
The Act responded to the inadequacies of
the previous regulations by instituting the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”).7 NPDES regulates indi-
vidual “point sources” at the point of dis-
charge, instead of attempting to discern
the dischargers’ contributions to the
receiving waters.8 Under the Act, any addi-
tion of a pollutant from a point source into
the nation’s waters must operate under
NPDES permits.9 The Act further empha-
sizes the dischargers’ responsibility by
holding them strictly liable for compliance
with their NPDES permit.10 Thus, good
faith efforts to control pollution discharges
are irrelevant if they prove inadequate.
Actual compliance with effluent limitations
must occur.
The Act assigns responsibility for
administering the NPDES program to
EPA.11 Although EPA may delegate per-
mitting authority to state agencies, EPA
promulgates the rules that establish the
framework for these permits and that
interpret how protective permits must be
to comply with the Clean Water Act.12 EPA
exercised this rulemaking authority by
publishing numerical effluent limitations,
applicable nationwide, to certain cate-
gories of industry specified in the Act.13
The limitations are technology-based,
requiring that industrial facilities use
“best available demonstrated control
technology” to reduce water pollution as
much as possible with what is available at
that time.14 The Act also directs EPA and
states to apply stricter controls to permit-
ting as necessary to maintain acceptable
water quality objectives.15 These direc-
tions address the foreseeable need for
tougher regulations and allows for
increased protection without the daunting
statutory amendment process.
Congress effected another important
change to water quality regulation by
including a citizen suit provision in the
Act.16 This provision offers citizens the
opportunity to perform a vital role in
enforcement. In the Act’s early stages, EPA
125
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5.  Id.  See Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act
TMDL Program V: Aftershock and Prelude, 32 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10385,10386 (2002) which states, "Ambient-based
management has not worked well in any media - air,
water, or waste. It requires enormous amounts of data. It
requires analysis that is rarely definitive and nearly
always litigable. It launches a process that never ends."
6.  Id. at 10385.
7.  Clean Water Act § 301, 402, 33 U.S.C. §
1311, 1342 (2002-2003).
8.  Clean Water Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362
(2002-2003) provides definitions including point
source, discharge of pollutant(s), effluent limita-
tion and industrial waste.
9.  Id.
10.  Clean Water Act § 301(k), 33 U.S.C. §
1311(a) (2002-2003).
11.  Steve M. Neugeboren, Clean Water Act Overview,
Address at the American Law Institute - American Bar
Association Continuing Legal Education Clean Water Act:
Law and Regulation (Oct. 23, 2002) (transcript available
on Westlaw at SH041 ALI-ABA 1 at 3).
12.  Id.
13.  Id. at 3-4. See Clean Water Act § 301, 304,
306(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311, 1314, 1316(b)(1)(A)
(2002-2003); see also 40 CFR 401.10 (2002). 
14.  Clean Water Act, § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §
1316(a)(1) (2002-2003). 
15.  Neugeboren, supra note 8, at 14. See also
Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(1)(C) (2002-2003). 
16.  Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2002-
2003) authorizes citizens to bring suit in the federal dis-
trict courts against "any person who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation ... or (B)
an order issued by the [EPA] Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation ...."
had its hands full with permitting dis-
chargers and setting effluent limitations
by the deadlines mandated by the Act.17
Thus, citizen suits became “the dominant-
ly used federal judicial enforcement
mechanism.”18 National organizations,
such as Natural Resources Defense
Council and Atlantic States Legal
Foundation brought the first enforcement
actions.19 These actions focused mainly
on large dischargers.20 Large corpora-
tions, discharging large amounts of noto-
rious pollutants and possessing money to
pay penalties, were an obvious starting
point. Victory in court on several enforce-
ment actions reinforced the importance
and the impact of citizen involvement.21
Recently, local environmental organi-
zations have embraced the mechanism of
citizen enforcement.22 As water quality
regulation moves toward a watershed
approach, local groups with knowledge of
the regulated area and a personal stake in
enforcement have taken charge.23 While
larger national groups focused on larger
dischargers to best utilize their funds, the
localized approach better addresses the
spectrum of dischargers in a certain area:
from small “mom and pop” facilities to
large industrial complexes. Analysis of
water quality issues from a watershed per-
spective acknowledges the importance of
the affect that smaller facilities in the
aggregate can have on water quality.
Applying this watershed approach to a
stormwater regulation scheme, consider-
ing not only large-scale dischargers but all
those contributing to the pollution prob-
lem, will increase the effectiveness of the
scheme.24
III. Stormwater Emerges as a
Significant Point Source
The Act shifted the focus of water
pollution enforcement to specific point
sources. In the thirty-one years since the
Act’s inception, this focus has resulted in
measurable improvements in water pollu-
tion control.25 For example, in 1970, only
thirty-six percent of the nation’s rivers and
lakes were safe to swim in.26 Today, that
percentage has increased to nearly two-
thirds.27 Progress in certain areas brings
attention to previously overlooked issues.
These new issues demand new regulation
and enforcement strategies. Point source
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17.  Lozeau, supra note 1, at 439-440.
18.  Id. at 440, n. 44 (quoting Jeffrey G. Miller,
Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control
Laws (Part I), 13 ELR 10309, 10314 (1983)). 
19.  Lozeau, supra note 1, at 440.
20. Id.
21.  Many early enforcement actions were
brought against EPA to compel EPA to set the guide-
lines mandated by the Clean Water Act. See Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320
(C.A.N.Y 1976). However, a study by Environmental
Law Institute showed almost 200 enforcement
actions were filed between 1978 and 1984. NRDC and
similar groups brought many of these actions. See
Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal
Pollution Control Laws Part III, 14 ELR 10407 (1984).
22.  See Lozeau, supra note 1, at 442-443.
23.  http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/
induspmt.doc at XIV (containing California's gen-
eral permit, which states that the goal of a water-
shed approach is managing water pollution).
24.  Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. §1311(2002-
2003) states that "all discharges of any pollutants by
any person shall be unlawful." See also Matthew Zinn,
Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement:
Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 81, 86, (2002) (discussing action by all
involved, including those "alienated by the policy-
making process" as a benefit of adding a cooperation
component to an enforcement scheme).
25.  http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanwater/overview/
26.  http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanwater/cleanwa-
ter_act/.
27  Id.
pollution from stormwater poses such a
challenge.
“Stormwater discharges are generat-
ed by precipitation and runoff from land,
pavements, building rooftops, and other
surfaces.”28 This runoff flows into storm
drains and then into the nation’s waters.
Paved or otherwise impervious areas do
not allow water to percolate through to
the ground below.29 Thus, hazardous
materials can accumulate and are washed
into storm drains. Discharges can include
arsenic, copper, zinc, chromium, mercury,
and lead.30 The amount of stormwater
runoff varies according to the frequency
and duration of precipitation among other
factors.31 The runoff does not adhere to
jurisdictional or political boundaries and
does not respect property rights.32 These
facts frustrate effective pollution enforce-
ment and necessitate regulating the ini-
tial point sources of the runoff, rather
than waiting until the discharges have
migrated into national waters.
Polluted runoff can cause a multitude
of problems. Environmental problems
range from toxin bioaccumulation in
aquatic flora and fauna to stream bed ero-
sion.33 Contaminated drinking water sup-
plies and recreation areas raise public
health concerns, and human health risks
can result from ingestion of the aforemen-
tioned contaminated flora and fauna.34
Another significant concern is wetland
health.35 California has lost ninety percent
of its wetland areas.36 These areas are very
important because wetlands naturally filter
water, control floods, and preserve biodi-
versity.37 Unpolluted stormwater dis-
charge can provide a valuable fresh water
supply to wetlands.38 However, polluted
stormwater can degrade wetlands and
impede their functioning.39 Wetlands are
usually categorized as part of the nation’s
waters and therefore the Clean Water Act
guidelines apply to pollutant discharges
into wetlands.40 As with oceans, bays, and
rivers, wetlands will benefit from effective
stormwater management. Wetland protec-
tion requires preventative solutions to
stormwater pollution because once pollu-
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28.  http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/watestorm-
water.html. Wash water, the runoff occurring when an
impervious area is washed, is technically not consid-
ered stormwater. However, wash water is regulated
along with stormwater under industrial permits, and
is therefore part of this discussion of stormwater
management. The difference between wash water
and stormwater is not important for this article
29. Id.
30.  http://www.tulane.edu/~mrbc/Urban
Toxins.html. See also http://www.epa.gov/ednnrm-
rl/publish/book/ handbook/chp1.pdf (providing a
table of stormwater toxicants and the potential
sources of these toxicants).
31.  Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism:
Lessons from Federal Regulation of Urban Stormwater
Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 18-19 (1995).
32.  Id. 
33.  http://tis.eh.doe.gov/oepa. This is the home-
page for the Department of Energy Office of
Environmental Policy and Guidance. The "Regulation
of Storm Water Discharges Under the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System" brief can
only be accessed by using the search function on the
home page to search for the term "storm- water". 
34.  Id. 
35.  Hugh Barroll, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of the Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
36.  http://ceres.ca.gov/wetlands/introduc-
tion/values.html. (stating the percentage of wet-
lands lost relates to the since  the time of
European settlement in California).
37.  See http://epa.gov/owow/wetlands/regs/
quality.html#6.0%20Implementation.
38.  http://epa.gov/owow/wetlands/regs/quali-
ty.html#6.0%20Implementation, at § 6.22. 
39.  Id. 
40  Id. at § 6.0. 
tants flow into wetland areas irreparable
damage to their viability and utility
occurs.41 Thus, a point-source approach
employing technology-based standards
will be beneficial because pollution will
be curtailed before it enters wetland
areas.  A better approach would involve
water quality based regulations, utilizing
numerical standards.  This more aggres-
sive enforcement scheme would not per-
mit industrial facilities to claim that they
are allowed to pollute because they are
employing the best technology available
to them.  With numerical standards based
on acceptable levels of water quality, facil-
ities either control discharges that exceed
the water quality standards or they violate
the standards (water quality would be
measured at the source of the discharge
for previously mentioned reasons).
Numerical standards are discussed later
in the article because the approach would
improve stormwater enforcement in gen-
eral, not simply with regard to wetlands. 
In 1990, EPA released stormwater reg-
ulations called the “National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Permit
Application Regulations for Storm Water
Discharges.”42 In these regulations, EPA
declared urban runoff to be a significant
cause of water pollution.43 EPA also
reported that a survey of thirty-seven
states called the “National Water Quality
Inventory 1988 Report to Congress” desig-
nated pollution from diffuse sources,
including urban runoff (stormwater) as the
main cause of impaired water quality.44
Today, regulators generally recognize
stormwater as a leading cause of water
pollution.45 Stormwater runoff from resi-
dential, commercial, and industrial areas
is responsible for twenty-one percent of
impaired lakes and forty-six percent of
impaired estuaries in the United States.46
This article focuses on industrial sources
of water pollution, leaving other sources
of runoff to separate, thorough examina-
tions.
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41.  http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/
menuofbmps/post.cfm. This document states that
non-structural best management practices that set
preventative policies from a project's inception
will protect sensitive areas such as wetlands.
42.  40 C.F.R. § 122-124 (2002).
43.  Id.
44.  Id.
45.  http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/facts/
point7.htm.
46.  http://www.epa.gov/earth1r6/6en/w/sw/
home.htm. The text from the section of this web-
page, entitled "Impact of Polluted Storm Water
Runoff," is as follows:
According to the Report to Congress on The Phase I
Storm Water Regulations, February 2000, urban
stormwater runoff contributes to 13 percent of impaired
rivers and streams, 21 percent of impaired lakes, 4 per-
cent of the impaired Great Lakes Shoreline, 55 percent of
impaired ocean shorelines, and 46 percent of impaired
estuaries. Stormwater runoff not only poses a threat to
ecological health (e.g., shellfish bed closures, elimina-
tion of habitat, stream bank erosion, flooding, chan-
nelization) but can also substantially affect human
health. In 1998, more than 1,500 beach closings and
advisories were associated with stormwater runoff
according the Natural Resource Defense Counsel's A
Guide to Water Quality on Vacation Beach, 1999. A
study conducted in Santa Monica Bay, California, con-
cluded that there was a 57-percent higher rate of ill-
ness in swimmers who swim adjacent to storm drains
than in swimmers who swim more than 400 yards
away from storm drains. In addition, the study docu-
mented a relationship between gastrointestinal ill-
ness in swimmers and water quality (Haile, R.W., et al
1996, An Epidemiological Study of Possible Adverse
Health Effects of Swimming in Santa Monica Bay)
(citation format left unaltered). See also Avi Brisman,
Considerations in Establishing a Stormwater Utility 26
S. ILL. U. L.J. 505, 505 (Spring 2002), which restates
EPA's declaration of  urban stormwater runoff as the
fourth largest cause of impairment to lakes in the
United States and the second largest cause of impair-
ment to the nation's estuaries.
Why is industrial stormwater runoff
such an intractable problem? Because
stormwater pollution amounts to “a death
by a thousand cuts.”47 With stormwater
pollution, there is not a discernable pipe
at each facility dripping a measurable
quantity of pollutant clearly attributable
to that pipe.48 Instead, a huge number of
different types and sizes of conveyances
exist, sometimes accumulating into a
large discharge made up of stormwater
that has flown through many facilities.
Consider, for example, an industrial
park.49 A management company owns the
property and leases out small areas to
independent businesses. Runoff from one
facility runs through the other parts of the
property, or onto separate properties. The
runoff ends up in a common storm drain,
mixing with discharge from other facili-
ties. The problem lies in determining who
contributed to the runoff, and how much
they contributed. The sheer number of
dischargers creates a regulatory night-
mare.
In 1987, Congress responded to this
egregious threat to water quality by pass-
ing the Water Quality Act of 1987.50 The
Water Quality Act amended the Clean
Water Act to include section 402(p).51 The
amendments instituted an NPDES
stormwater program much like the pro-
gram for traditional point sources out-
lined in section 402 of the Clean Water
Act.52 The 1987 amendments established
a framework for regulation and authorized
EPA to implement that framework.53
Although stormwater was not a priority for
EPA prior to 1987, EPA responded to the
amendments by developing a two-phase
regulation strategy targeting industrial
dischargers and municipalities. On
November 16, 1990, EPA published regu-
lations requiring that all stormwater dis-
chargers in eleven specified categories
obtain an NPDES permit.54 The categories
aimed to encompass most new and exist-
ing dischargers with few exceptions. The
regulations directed dischargers to utilize
best available technologies to manage
their stormwater.55 These technology-
based standards serve as proactive meas-
ures, concentrating pollution control
efforts on keeping pollutants out of
runoff. EPA also set numerical effluent
limitations for ten industrial categories.56
Facilities are encouraged to implement
the technologies initially, rather than
waiting until their runoff exceeds a certain
numerical standard.
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47.  Shana Lazerow, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of the Law panel discussion (Jan. 14,
2003).
48.  Id.
49.  This example was inspired by a section in
Lozeau, supra note 1, at 460-467. The section
described San Francisco BayKeeper's enforcement
strategy for a property located at 716 McCosker
Street in Richmond, California.
50.  http://tis.eh.doe.gov/oepa/. Choose "Clean
Water Act" in the "Subject Area Listing" drop-down
menu. Then choose the guidance entitled
"Regulation of Storm Water Discharges under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System."
This document gives a wonderful history of the evolu-
tion of the Clean Water Act that resulted in amend-
ments addressing stormwater management.
51.  Id.
52.  Lozeau, supra note 1, at 446. See also Clean
Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2002-2003).
53.  Lozeau, supra note 1, at 446.
54.  http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs
/induspmt.doc. See also 40 CFR § 122.26(b)(14) (2002).
55.  Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(2002-2003).
56.  40 C.F.R. § 122, App. A (2002).
A. Stormwater Permitting
EPA’s regulations authorize states to
govern day-to-day administration of
stormwater management through individ-
ual or general permits that regulate
stormwater discharges.57 Individual per-
mits demand distinct assessments. Thus,
the regulatory agency bears the burden of
constructing an individual plan for each
applicant.58 Conversely, under a general
permitting scheme, each facility is meas-
ured against a common set of criteria.
General permitting allows agencies to
concentrate on enforcement rather than
assessing each facility to create unique
permits. Enforcement under a common
standard requires less energy than work-
ing with a multitude of individual permits
and the subsequent multitude of stan-
dards. Thus, a general permit provides a
more efficient process for agencies.
General permits ease the regulated
community’s burden as well, especially for
smaller facilities with severely limited
resources. Applying for an individual per-
mit requires a tremendous amount of
time and attention to detail.59 Under a
general permit the discharger simply files
a notice of intent to comply with the per-
mit, pays a fee, and files an annual report
with the designated authority.60 This less
arduous process may persuade some
facilities to comply. The general permit
also represents a common standard appli-
cable to every discharger. This increases
certainty among dischargers, who often
feel unfairly singled out or unjustly bur-
dened by water quality regulation.
B. California’s Permit
In California, the State Water
Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”)
assumed permitting responsibility.61
SWRCB chose a general permit to avoid
the onerous process of individual permit-
ting. In 1991, SWRCB issued the general
statewide industrial discharge permit. The
permit requires all facilities falling under
one of EPA’s eleven industrial categories
to file a notice of intent to comply with
the permit (NOI).62 Each facility must also
pay a $700 annual permit fee.63
The permit incorporates EPA’s
numerical effluent limitations for the ten
categories specified in the Code of
Federal Regulations.64 Facilities conduct-
ing business in one of the ten regulated
areas must abide by these numerical lim-
itations.65 The permit considers this level
of compliance sufficient for the pollutants
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57.  40 C.F.R. § 123.25 (2002). See also
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/induspmt.
doc.
58.  http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/3510-2F.pdf.
See also Shana Lazerow, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of the Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
59.  Shana Lazerow, Remarks at UC Hastings College
of the Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003). See also
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/sbforms/form200.pdf. The docu-
ment, the California Water Discharge Requirement and
Individual NPDES Permit Application, is eight pages long
and requires a complete characterization of discharges,
including a map that identifying surface water that may be
discharged and a listing of Best Management Practices.
60.  Id.
61.  http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/whatis-
sw.html.
62.  40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2002).
63.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23 § 2200(2)(B)(2003).
64.  40 C.F.R. 411, 412, 418, 419, 422, 423, 434,
436, 440, 443 (2002).
65.  http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs
induspmt.doc at VIII-IX. See also id. at IV, which
lists the ten categories with EPA numerical efflu-
ent standards. The permit states that these efflu-
ent standards must be adhered to and that the
permit provides "additional requirements."
specified in the limitations. Facilities
falling outside of these categories must
employ best management practices
(“BMP”) to control discharges. BMPs are
stormwater management mechanisms
representing non-numeric effluent limita-
tions.66 BMPs constitute compliance with
the technology-based standards mandat-
ed by the Act.67 Facilities within EPA’s ten
categories must still institute BMPs for all
discharges of pollutants not covered by a
numeric effluent limitation.
The permit requires BMPs to comp
with water quality standards for receiving
waters, as well as with point source regu-
lations.68 Thus, the permit anticipates sit-
uations where facilities utilize BMPs and
receiving waters still exceed pollution lim-
its, thereby requiring additional control
measures.69 These additional controls
reflect the Act’s main goal, which is to
maintain the integrity of the nation’s
waters by expending whatever effort nec-
essary.70 SWRCB’s general permit indus-
trial stormwater controls echo the fore-
sight of the Act.
The general permit’s strategy is three-
fold: develop and implement a
Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan
(SWPPP), monitor discharges and report
monitoring results annually to the
Regional Water Quality Control Board (a
regional branch of the SWRCB), and
implement BMPs to keep pollution from
migrating offsite in stormwater runoff.71
Facilities must keep copies of all docu-
ments on site and provide them to
SWRCB upon demand.72 All documents
produced in accordance with the permit
are public documents.73
In the current system, everyone
involved has a defined role. Industry must
assess its discharges, develop and imple-
ment a plan to reduce pollutants, monitor
its performance, and report to SWRCB.
SWRCB, and occasionally EPA,74 monitor
industry’s progress. Citizen groups make
sure that SWRCB and industry are doing
their job.  However, the system can be
streamlined even more.
IV. Barriers to Effective Enforcement
The Act has improved the state of the
nation’s waters.75 However, sixteen years
after the stormwater amendments,
stormwater remains one of the most egre-
gious threats to water quality. All involved
in the process expresses opinions about
what they see as barriers to effective
enforcement in this area. Two barriers
seem to generate a consensus: a lack of
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66.  Interim Permitting Approach to Water Quality
Based Effluent Limitations in Storm Water Permits EPA
Office of Water document EPA 883-D-96-001
(September 1996), also found at http://www.epa.gov/cgi-
bin/claritgw. See also Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
67.  http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs
induspmt.doc, at IX.
68.  Id. 
69.  Lozeau, supra note 1, at 443. 
70.  Clean Water Act §101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(2002-2003).
71.  http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/
induspmt.doc, at II. 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. at XIV.
74.  Hugh Barroll, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
75.  William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water
Pollution Control in the United States - State, Local, and
Federal Efforts 1789-1972: PART I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
145, 200 n.5 (2003): "Between 1973 and 1987, for example,
the amount of oxygen-consuming organic material
directly discharged by industry fell 93 percent. See U.S.
resources and a perception of an uneven
process.76
A.  Lack of Resources 
Stores in a Washington State logging
town once sold bumper stickers embla-
zoned with the question “Are You an
Environmentalist, or Do You Work for a
Living?”77 The question provides a fitting
starting point for this section because it
speaks to the fundamental reason behind
inefficient allocation of resources. A com-
mon view exists that the relationship
between those who want to protect water
quality and those whose work results in
pollutant discharge is an adversarial one.78
Adversarial situations, by definition, do not
foster cooperation between participants in
the process. Rather, they produce systems
comprised of individual actors, unwilling
to share responsibility. This defensive
behavior can lead to a situation where each
participant struggles to use her finite
resource pool to affect all areas of the sys-
tem, instead of focusing on her strengths.
The environmentalist v. industry view
is a simplistic one, classifying all industri-
al employees as anti-environment and all
enforcement agencies and organizations
as anti-business. Reality is not nearly as
black and white. For instance, many
industrial facilities do work to comply
with stormwater regulations. The
Regional Water Quality Control Board
(RWQCB) receives numerous annual
reports from facilities last year.79 Industry
groups, who advise facilities on stormwa-
ter issues, derive their business from dis-
chargers’ compliance efforts. For example,
NEST Environmental in Mountain View,
California, counsels about 150-250 clients
in their group program in addition to 50-
60 individual facilities.80 Negotiation
between agencies and dischargers to
extend deadlines in exchange for a prom-
ise of compliance by the dischargers pro-
vides another example. The extensions
can reflect an acknowledgment by the
agency of discharger’s realistic need for
more time to implement BMPs. It is
important to note however that failure by
the agencies to impose fines when even
these extended deadlines are exceeded
does not further compliance goals.  This
failure to enforce leads citizen groups to
distrust agencies and promotes the per-
ception of agencies as pro-industry.
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Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Policy, Planning, and
Evaluation, Environmental Investments: The Cost of a
Clean Environment: A Summary Report to Congress 5-4
to 5-5 (Dec. 1990). Much of this decline was due to the
fact that many companies have chosen to divert waste-
water to municipal treatment facilities rather than build
their own treatment capacity. Industry, in fact, directs
approximately 73 percent of its organic waste to publicly
owned treatment plants. See Id. Despite an increase of 35
percent in the amount of organic material sent to munic-
ipal treatment facilities between 1972 and 1996, these
municipal plants have succeeded in reducing their dis-
charge of organic material by 43 percent. See Andrew
Stoddard et al., Progress in Water Quality: An Evaluation
of the Environmental and Economic Benefits of the 1972,
Clean Water Act in Proceedings of the Water
Environment Federation 83 (May 3-6, 1998, Denver)."
76.  Hugh Barroll, Shana Lazerow, and Don
Reh, Remarks at UC Hastings College of the Law
panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003). See also Lozeau,
supra note 1, at 463; see also Zinn, supra note 21,
(consistently citing scarce resources as a reason
for a more collaborative approach to regulation). 
77.  Richard White, Are You an
Environmentalist or Do You Work For a Living?, in
ON COMMON GROUND 171 (William Cronon ed.,
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996).
78.  Zinn, supra note 21, at 88.
79.  See generally www.swrcb.ca.gov.
80.  Don Reh, Remarks at UC Hastings College
of the Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003). 
Collaboration will only succeed if all sides
trust the others to do their part.
Good faith efforts notwithstanding,
participants in stormwater management
approach the overall issue in a traditional,
adversarial way. This approach ignores the
beneficial aspects of collaborative
enforcement.81 Through collaboration,
participants can focus their resources on
specific tasks, while trusting others to
work on other tasks.
Industry, state and federal agencies,
and environmental organizations have
varied individual goals. Businesses want
to make profits and pay the bills. Agencies
want to make sure Congress’ intentions
are adequately implemented. Environ-
mental groups want to protect natural
resources. However, all of the players are
united by the Clean Water Act’s federally
mandated objective: restoration and
maintenance of the integrity of our
nation’s waters.82 Each plays a role in
stormwater management that is assigned
to them by federal law. Thus, the question
is not whether you are an environmental-
ist or you work for a living, but rather how
you will share the burden of stormwater
pollution control while still pursuing indi-
vidual goals. A more collaborative process
could be the answer.83
Each player brings strengths and
weaknesses to the table. Using one’s
strengths to compensate for another’s
weaknesses increases efficiency. An adver-
sarial “good guy v. bad guy” scenario does
not. A collaborative effort will ease the bur-
den on everyone, allowing the players to
focus more on their individual goals.
Resources are scarce. Therefore, it is
important to identify areas of enforcement
that could be better handled using anoth-
er’s resources. If everyone is maximizing
the use of his or her resources, scarcity
notwithstanding, efficiency will improve.
This premise assumes, of course, that each
player exerts an honest effort to adhere to
the collaborative strategy. Many feel this is
a pipe dream, no pun intended. However,
with a system of checks and balances each
side might have incentives to comply with
the collaborative effort.
The Clean Water Act mandates that
EPA regulate stormwater runoff. Although
EPA employs around 18,000 people, its
staff is responsible for all fifty states, as
well as U.S. territories as far away as
Guam. Even on a regional level, the EPA
office responsible for California is also
responsible for three other states and a
group of U.S. territories.84 In addition to a
large service area, EPA also tackles a
diverse spectrum of environmental prob-
lems from water quality to endangered
species to global warming.85
EPA does not have time to manage
stormwater runoff at a local level.86
Instead, EPA assumes two dominant reg-
ulatory roles that drive stormwater protec-
tions. First, EPA sets standards.87 EPA
writes regulations that apply nationwide.
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81.  Zinn, supra note 21, at 99 (discussing four
benefits of collaborative enforcement strategies:
possibility of lower administrative costs, increas-
ing perception of fairness, greater potential for
investment in new environmentally beneficial
technology, and more flexibility to "trade" for more
compliance in area where needed).
82.  Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(2002-2003).
83.  Zinn, supra note 21, at 86.
84.  http://www.epa.gov/epahome/whereyoulive.htm.
85.  http://www.epa.gov/epahome/topics.html.
86.  Hugh Barroll, at Remarks at UC Hastings
College of Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
87.  Id.
The regulations provide a uniform set of
rules that guide state and local enforce-
ment. The rule that EPA promulgated for
stormwater pollution control can be
found in the Code of Federal
Regulations.88 40 C.F.R. § 122.26
(2003)[industry at § 122.26(a)(4).  Through
regulations, EPA identified categories of
industry that must obtain an NPDES per-
mit, set effluent guidelines for certain cat-
egories, and outlined the role of BMP in
permit compliance. These regulations are
a product of EPA’s experience and its
direct accountability to Congress to
implement the 1987 Clean Water Act
Amendments.  EPA creates the framework
for stormwater enforcement. 
Second, EPA serves as a “backstop.”89
When no other party attacks an environmen-
tal issue, EPA steps in. EPA has delegated
authority to the SWRCB.90 Subsequently,
the SWRCB authorized the RWQCBs to man-
age the process on a local level.91 With state
and regional water boards involved, as well
as active citizen enforcement and industry
groups, EPA is justified in shifting its focus
to other problems while remaining an
important check on the stormwater enforce-
ment process.
The shift from national to local citi-
zen enforcement organizations increased
agency-citizen group cooperation.92 Both
RWQCB and local groups in a certain geo-
graphic area have knowledge of the area
and experience with the unique local situ-
ation.93 Local groups often focus their
attention on local issues. These groups
often send representatives to RWQCB
meetings and maintain constant contact
with the agency.94
Although RWQCB and citizen groups
maintain a relationship, the two players
act in separate spheres. Both sides
acknowledge the lack of time, money, and
manpower to uniformly address the mag-
nitude of discharges and dischargers.95
However, the process remains disjointed.
Both try to tackle all areas of stormwater
enforcement.96 There simply are not
enough resources on either side to indi-
vidually regulate everyone all the time.
The result fuels arguments from industry
that enforcement is arbitrary and unfair.
Industry’s distrust of the enforcement
methods used by agencies and citizen
groups then deters industry from collabo-
ration. Industry noncompliance then cre-
ates more enforcement problems for citi-
zen groups and agencies. The situation
feeds itself.
B. Collaboration and Division of Labor 
Industrial dischargers in California
can be divided into two groups: those dis-
chargers who have filed a notice of intent
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88.  40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (2003). See id., at § 122.26(a)(4)
for regulations specific to industrial stormwater.
89.  Hugh Barroll, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of the Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
90.  http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/
induspmt.doc, at II.
91.  http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/
induspmt.doc (discussing the enforcement
authority of both SWRCB and RWQCB). See also
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/whatissw.html,
which describes the enforcement and monitoring
function of the RWQCBs.
92.  Lozeau, supra note 1, at 452.
93.  Id.
94.  Id. at 456-457.
95.  Shana Lazerow, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
96.  http://www.sfbaykeeper.org/html/baykeeper.html.
See also http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/index.html.
to comply with the industrial general per-
mit and those who have not. All facilities
currently operating under the general
industrial permit are required to file an
annual report containing monitoring data
by July 1 of each year.97 Last year, SWRCB
received 8736 reports for the entire
state.98 Eighty-one facilities required to
file a report did not file.99 Some facilities
submitted only partially complete reports.
During that same time period, SWRCB
records show that 1273 facilities failed to
pay their annual dues.100 Some facilities
have outstanding dues dating back as far
as 1993.101 Consequently, many permitted
facilities are in direct violation of the per-
mit for failure to report and/or pay dues
and can be fined.
The current fining process provides
incentives for industry noncompliance.
Agencies often delay notifying facilities of
permit violations. After notification, agen-
cies then often delay fines. In a 1999 report
on state agency enforcement of water pol-
lution laws, the EPA inspector general
found that state agencies failed to collect
data from many facilities and let twenty-
five percent of major water polluters’ dis-
charge permits expire without noticing.102
The inspector general went on to report
that when finally imposed, the fines were
inadequate deterrents, collected well after
the violation occurred, or not collected at
all.103 California was cited as one of three
states that routinely takes over a year to
penalize water pollution violators.104 The
inspector general also cited California
specifically for failure to collect fines for
stormwater violations.105
This inadequate follow-up undoubt-
edly results from the limited resources
available to the SWRCB. Regardless, many
industrial dischargers hear a two-fold
message. One, that SWRCB is not gen-
uinely concerned with fair and effective
stormwater pollution control.106 Two, the
more profitable avenue is noncompliance
because fines occur later, if at all. If fines
are promptly imposed and the violator
does not pay, follow-up can be delayed
once again. During these interims
between the discovery of noncompliance
and collection of penalties, many viola-
tors are operating without having to
expend money and manpower. They are
not paying fines or instituting adequate
BMPs to control their discharges.
SWRCB has delegated authority to
RWQCBs to bring these rogue permitted
facilities into compliance. The SWRCB
compiles annual reports and dues infor-
mation obtained from RWQCBs in a data-
base. The database information could be
separated by geographic area and distrib-
uted to RWQCBs to tackle in manageable
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97.  www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/annrpt
02_03.doc
98.  Id. This data is from 2001-2002. The data
from 2002-2003 is not yet available on the website. 
99.  Id.
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102.  Seth Bornstein, States Let Polluters Off Easy,
EPA says, INQUIRER WASHINGTON BUREAU, Aug. 24,
2001 available at http://www.talkinternational.
com/news_environment_august_24a_01.htm.
103. Id.
104.  Id. The other two states are Utah and North
Carolina. As for California, the report claims that 50% of
all water pollution violations in San Francisco were
enforced one year or more after the violation occurred.
105.  Id.
106.  Don Reh, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
chunks. This division of labor will effectu-
ate consistent enforcement because each
RWQCB will be accountable for its own
geographic area.
The usual multiple rounds of notice
letters could be replaced with a single
notice to comply. Prompt follow-up,
issuance of fines by a stated deadline, and
the promise of more fines if dues and
annual reports are not received by
RWQCB in a timely manner will create
essential incentives to comply. The key is
to make compliance more profitable to
dischargers than noncompliance.
RWQCB’s persistence will create an incon-
venience remedied only by dischargers’
adherence to their SWPPPs and adequate
BMPs. Dischargers will also recognize
state agencies’ serious commitment to
improving water quality. Also, enforcing
regulations will generate more funds for
increased regulation. SWRCB will get
compensation for its regulation effort only
if it actually collects the fines it imposes.
Again, by dividing up enforcement
between each RWQCB, with SWRCB
supervising the work, this process will
result in more efficient enforcement.
If RWQCBs focus their efforts on per-
mitted noncompliance cases, local citizen
groups can then focus on unpermitted
facilities. RWQCBs already compile infor-
mation on permitted facilities and already
send notices to those facilities not in
compliance. Citizen groups have staff, vol-
unteers and concerned citizens willing to
search for unpermitted facilities.107 Thus,
they have a unique and already estab-
lished strength and should concentrate
their efforts there.
C. Administrative Hearing
Some members of the regulated
community show their disappointment
with stormwater enforcement through
noncompliance.  This mechanism does
not convey the specific concerns of indus-
try nor does it promote collaboration to
affect change. Also, due to the current
inefficient allocation of resources, the
voice of noncompliance goes largely
unheard.  Many noncompliant facilities fly
below the radar for years, causing no stir
in the SWRCB. An effective way to engage
the regulated community in the enforce-
ment system is essential to the success of
the system. However, the present avenues
available to industry are inadequate.
Citizen groups have attempted to
hold educational events on stormwater
pollution to increase effective awareness
of the problem within the community.
However, this is not the most effective
enforcement tool for the regulated com-
munity. For example, a few years ago a
California citizen enforcement group
called DeltaKeeper tried to hold a work-
shop on stormwater compliance to pro-
vide a forum for industry in the town of
Stockton to express its concerns.108 For
whatever the reason, be it a perception of
unfairness or adversity, or simply a lack of
time or interest, attendance was minimal.
However, when DeltaKeeper instead sent
sixty-day notices expressing intent to
bring enforcement actions, dischargers
filed for permits. The threat of litigation
brought about the positive result of com-
pliance. However, there is a spiraling neg-
ative effect of this tactic: industry fails to
voluntarily comply with stormwater regu-
lations, citizen groups have no other
136
W
ES
T 

N
O
R
TH
W
ES
T
Christine Chestnut Volume 9, Number 2
107.  Shana Lazerow, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
108.  Id.
recourse but to file lawsuits, and industry
then responds by not complying. Both
sides distrust the other, and have no
incentive to work with each other. Any
potential for collaboration is lost in the
resulting adversarial legal process.
Court provides the alternative to edu-
cation and community involvement. Court
is problematic as well. Agencies and citi-
zen groups expend valuable resources on
litigation. Their goal of effective stormwa-
ter management is dampened by the
energy expended during a few drawn out
lawsuits. Larger industries can use this to
their advantage by using their large
resource base to draw out litigation until
it becomes unbeneficial to the regulator.
Conversely, smaller dischargers do not
have the resources to express their con-
cerns in court. Attorney fees and court
costs can exceed the cost of noncompli-
ance, especially with delays in permit
enforcement. These high costs result in
out of court settlements. Although such a
settlement is better than evading compli-
ance altogether, the concerns of the regu-
lated community are still not expressed.
Collaboration will only occur if everyone
involved feels that they play an active role
in the system.
Another problem with litigation
exists. Fines imposed by the court go to
the United States Treasury, not the citizen
group, the SWRCB, or even the communi-
ty where the violation occurred. Thus,
everyone involved spends resources and
the community receives no direct remedi-
al benefit. Apart from lack of monetary
benefit to local agencies and citizen
groups, this aspect of the enforcement
process may fuel industry’s concern that
the system exists for interests other than
improving water quality.
In his article Tailoring Citizen
Enforcement to an Expanding Clean Water Act,
Michael Lozeau recommends implement-
ing an administrative hearing process to
hear citizen enforcement issues.  An
administrative process at the local level,
either at RWQCB’s office or at EPA’s
regional office, would provide a forum for
all participants to make their case. No
exorbitant attorney fees or outrageous
court costs would be involved. If an
acceptable agreement is reached, any
money paid by dischargers could go
directly to local compliance efforts.
The atmosphere would be more
informal then a courtroom. Thus, this
forum may prove to be a less contentious
environment, possibly forging collabora-
tive relationships between all participat-
ing groups. At the very least, representa-
tives from each camp will get to know
each other on a personal level that is not
achieved through summonses and court
appearances. The local agencies will hear
the concerns of the regulated community
and the citizen enforcement organizations
and be able to make adjustments in their
enforcement strategies accordingly.
The administrative hearing option
should be open to anyone involved in
stormwater management. Again, unifor-
mity will hopefully quell unfairness argu-
ments. The risk that all facilities will pur-
sue and overwhelm this option if available
is rather small. Some larger facilities will
continue to opt for traditional, drawn-out
litigation. This is a prudent strategy for a
company that has more resources then the
citizen group or agency bringing the action.
A bet on the rare occurrence of a judge
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imposing an adequately deterrent penalty
seems wise when weighed against pre-
dictably large compliance costs.109
Additionally, the administrative procedure
represents a more collaborative approach.
Court can be reserved for extreme cases of
noncompliance: a last resort.
D. The Perception of an Unfair Process
A collaborative process will focus the
strengths of agencies, citizen groups, and
the regulated community on specific tasks.
However, collaboration will never improve
the efficiency of the present system unless
each participant agrees to truly work within
the collaborative framework. For example, if
citizen groups do not trust agencies to be
strict with permitted facilities, the citizen
group will shift some of its attention back to
its original individual strategy to assure that
the work gets done. This undermines the
process. Also, if facilities continue to skirt
the permitting process, collaboration on the
part of agencies and citizen groups will not
be as effective.
This mistrust is understandable given
the players’ past adversarial interactions,
their diverse ideas about enforcement
strategies, what each feels are causes of
inadequacies in the present system, and fail-
ure to agree on what constitutes adequate
stormwater controls to protect our waterway.
However, a collaborative process does not
terminate those enforcement ideas and
does not amount to blind faith in the other
participants. In fact, each participant can act
as a check on the others. For example, citizen
groups can still bring actions against agen-
cies and dischargers. Citizen groups can also
intervene in agency actions against discharg-
ers. EPA can utilize its rule-making and back-
stop functions to set precedents and pro-
mote regulatory uniformity. EPA also reviews
settlements made by dischargers to citizen
groups to prevent sham settlements.110
So long as we operate from a capital-
ist perspective, there will never be a truly
fair stormwater enforcement system.111
Any process operating within a free mar-
ket system with finite resources and a
wide range of competing businesses pos-
sesses inherently unfair qualities. Thus,
there will always be those in the regulated
community who feel that they were unfair-
ly singled out for enforcement action. The
reality is that regardless of fairness, the
Act requires facilities to control their dis-
charges. The Act is not concerned with
who gets regulated or how. Recognizing
that complete fairness is unattainable
should not end all discussion of fairness
factors when evaluating improvements to
the system. Perceptions of unfairness
impede enforcement efforts and stop col-
laboration dead in its tracks. Thus, fair-
ness remains an important factor in
stormwater enforcement’s evolution.
Participants in stormwater manage-
ment will only invest their precious time,
money, and energy in a somewhat defined
and comprehensible system that pro-
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109.  Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. §
1319 (d) (2002-2003) states the maximum per diem
penalty as $25,000 per violation. However, the
judge has discretion and may weigh many factors
before rendering a penalty decision. These factors
include the seriousness of the violation, the eco-
nomic benefit to the discharger derived because
they were allowed to operate in violation of their
permit, and the economic hardship penalties will
impose upon the dischargers.
110.  Hugh Barroll, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
111.  Shana Lazerow, Remarks at UC Hastings
College of Law panel discussion (Jan. 14, 2003).
duces somewhat foreseeable outcomes.
The lack of these conditions hinders the
current enforcement system. The lack of
numeric standards in the general industri-
al permit, inconsistent follow-up by agen-
cies, and a large number of facilities evad-
ing the permit process result in uncertain-
ty about the process and its effects.
Industry does not know what to expect
and therefore has no incentive to consis-
tently be predictable themselves. Citizen
groups struggle to compel facilities to
comply with permits that contain arguably
vague restrictions.
Feelings of unfairness in the system
can develop from this uncertainty.
Ambiguous regulations open the door to
allegations of favoritism. Larger facilities
claim that they are being singled out and
discriminated against. Smaller facilities
claim that uniform penalties and fees
leave them bankrupt while not deterring
large corporations in the least. Facilities
with pending actions against them won-
der why they are targets when facilities all
around them are operating free of such
legal complications. The delays in
enforcement of legal judgments against
facilities destroy any incentive to volun-
tarily pay early. Reservations exist about
working within a permitting system that
allows many dischargers to remain unper-
mitted. Collaboration will require
improvements to the certainty and fair-
ness of the current system.
E. Numerical Standards
California’s general industrial permit
is ambiguous. It lacks numerical stan-
dards, instead relying on the concept of
BMPs. Although BMPs provide flexibility
to accommodate unique industrial opera-
tions, which management practices are
“best” and how do facilities know when
they are sufficiently utilizing them? The
permit refers to the Act’s regulations and
to EPA’s numeric effluent limitations.
These references create uncertainty about
which standards apply to a particular
facility or to particular components of
that facility’s discharge, and about what
components make up an adequate moni-
toring system. Actual numbers do not
appear in the general permit, adding
another layer of inconvenience and possi-
bility for misinterpretation to industry’s
duties. Facilities must monitor and report
on their discharges without adequate
knowledge of what they are monitoring or
reporting. Not surprisingly though, many
dischargers argue against adding numer-
ic standards to the general permit.
Without hard numbers, compliance
issues can be debated. With numerical
standards, violators can no longer plead
ignorance and can no longer rely on the
possibility of a court interpreting vague
standards in their favor.
F. Leveling the Playing Field
As previously discussed, a limited
amount of enforcement resources allows
many unpermitted facilities to go unde-
tected and to evade penalties. Agencies
and citizen groups simply do not have the
manpower to regulate everyone under the
present system. This lack of uniform
enforcement creates an incentive for
facilities to fly below everyone’s radar.
When a facility is caught violating their
permit, or without a permit, it can easily
make the argument that it is being unfair-
ly singled out.
The auto dismantling industry in
California provides an example of permit-
ting uncertainty. There are 1,500 licensed
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vehicle dismantlers in California.112
However, of the 1,500 dismantlers
licensed to operate in California, only
about 600 have filed notice of intent to
comply with the general industrial per-
mit.113 Nine-hundred facilities opted not
to apply for permit coverage. Sixty to
sixty-five percent of the vehicles bought
by vehicle dismantlers at auctions are
thought to be purchased by these unper-
mitted businesses.114
Thus, facilities choosing to get per-
mits are at a disadvantage. They spend
$700 for permit fees annually.
Implementing BMPs and joining industry
groups add costs. These costs greatly bur-
den smaller facilities. Unpermitted facili-
ties operate without these costs. Given
SWRCB’s and citizen groups’ limited
resources, the chance that they will be
singled out for disciplinary action is slim.
There is a tremendous incentive to get
lost in the large pool of unpermitted and
non-compliant facilities.
Permitted facilities also expose
themselves to a phenomenon called
“Shoot the Volunteer.”115 When a facility
applies to RWQCB for permit coverage,
RWQCB enters its name, address, phone
number, and other information into an
easily accessible database.116 Each per-
mitted facility is required to submit annu-
al reports to RWQCB. RWQCB updates the
database with annual report data. The
public has access to this data.117 Thus, the
task of discovering non-compliant permit-
ted facilities is markedly easier then find-
ing unpermitted facilities. RWQCB or citi-
zen groups can simply peruse the data-
base. The facilities that try to abide by the
rules become the first to be scrutinized
because they offer their information. This
is the “Shoot the Volunteer” theory.
A collaborative approach to this
uncertainty seems best.  As previously
discussed, RWQCBs should focus their
efforts on bringing permitted facilities
into compliance. RWQCBs already have a
database of compliance information for
permitted facilities. In fact, they expend
the needed energy to create and update
the database. By focusing solely on per-
mitted facilities, RWQCBs can direct their
attention to enforcement of strict notice
and fine periods. Prompt warning letter
distribution followed by imposing fines by
fixed deadlines will deter permitted facili-
ties from noncompliance. Prompt follow-
up will also reassure the regulated com-
munity that RWQCB cares about improv-
ing water quality. The approach must be
rigid and must be applied to all permitted
facilities in order to convey the serious-
ness the of stormwater enforcement
process. Uniform permitting and enforce-
ment will motivate businesses to comply
with the permit because they will not feel
as though they are operating within an
unfair system. As certainty in the system
increases, the willingness of industry to
collaborate will increase. A resource-
intensive burst of enforcement will gener-
ate compliance and hopefully result in
less work in the future for SWRCB and cit-
izen groups. This strategy will also lend
credibility to agencies and citizen groups
by fostering a reputation for timely and
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strong enforcement action.
With the RWQCBs focused on one
category of facilities, citizen groups can
focus on the other - the unpermitted.
Citizen groups already enlist the help of
volunteers in the community, lawyers,
local citizen groups, skippers, and whoev-
er else is willing to help. These people
investigate pollution sources and find vio-
lators by going into the community and
looking for them. Some unpermitted facil-
ities can be found simply by flipping
through the phonebook or contacting
statewide associations such as State of
California Auto Dismantler Association
(“SCADA”). However, some facilities are
not as obvious.
Twenty-two percent of the previously
mentioned 1500 auto dismantlers belong
to SCADA.118 SCADA’s code of ethics com-
pels its members to “strive and maintain a
clean and non-polluted environment in
[their] places of business.” However, the
organization does not enforce this creed.
Divulging permit data would be both use-
ful to agencies and citizen groups and
work toward forwarding SCADA’s goal.
V.  Conclusion
Sixteen years after Congress added
stormwater management to the Clean
Water Act’s goals, stormwater is still an
egregious problem. Barriers to effective
enforcement include a lack of resources
and uncertainty about the process.
Increased collaboration is the answer.
Resources are scarce across the
board. The economic climate in California
does not seem ready to expand these
resources anytime soon. Therefore, the
most efficient use of resources will pro-
duce the most effective enforcement.
Each participant in stormwater manage-
ment must play a specific role. EPA can
continue to serve rule-making and “back-
stop” functions. SWRCB can regulate per-
mitted facilities. RWQCBs can tackle
localized groups of permit-violators.
Citizen groups can focus on finding unper-
mitted facilities, creating a situation
where operating within the permit system
is more attractive than operating outside
it. Industry can utilize industry groups and
the administrative hearing forum to
develop realistic and successful compli-
ance strategies. These specific roles utilize
everyone’s limited resources efficiently.
Participants will still initiate litiga-
tion, but only when necessary to bring the
non-cooperative into compliance. Admin-
istrative hearings should replace court
appearances. In these hearings, relation-
ships between participants will be formed
and concerns can be raised without incur-
ring the enormous costs and adhering to
burdensome formalities of court. Also,
money from settlements in this forum can
fund local compliance efforts, rather than
the U.S. Treasury.
The participants must believe in the
collaborative process for it to work.
Uncertainty forms a considerable barrier
to collaborative enforcement because
uncertainty creates disincentives for
industry to apply and comply with the
general permit. These disincentives com-
plicate the other participants’ enforce-
ment efforts.
The lack of numerical standards in
California’s general industrial permit,
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inadequate follow-up, and a perceived
uneven playing field among the regulated
community all contribute to uncertainty
within the regulated community. EPA
should either set numeric standards for
all industrial dischargers or direct the task
to SWRCB. Industry will then have num-
bers to compare their monitoring results
to. They will know where their SWPPPs are
deficient and institute adequate BMPs to
ensure compliance with numerical dis-
charge limits. SWRCB, focusing solely on
permitted facilities, can then establish
and abide by rigid compliance deadlines
based on these numeric standards. By
consistently following-up and promptly
fining violators, SWRCB will project conti-
nuity, reliability, and a genuine desire to
improve water quality. 
Improving uncertainty will also
address industry’s unfairness argument.
Consistency will show the regulated com-
munity that no one is being unfairly sin-
gled out. Consistency provides the much
needed incentive to facilities to apply for
a permit
There will never be a truly fair system.
Uncertainty will always persist on some
level. Resources will undoubtedly contin-
ue to dwindle. However, the goal of the
Clean Water Act to restore and maintain
the integrity of the nation’s waters
remains a federally mandated objective.
Stormwater enforcement can progress
toward this objective if participants divide
the work, create and enforce rigid proce-
dures and numeric standards, and work
within a more informal administrative
forum when possible. The resulting
enforcement system will not immediately
end stormwater pollution. However, it will
be a giant step in the right direction.
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Stormwater Resource Guide
1. NPDES Stormwater Program
http://cfpub1.epa.gov/npdes/home.cfm?program_id=6
Overview of the Environmental Protection Agency’s National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).  Contains technical and regulatory
information about the NPDEs stormwater program.
2. Puget Soundkeeper Alliance
www.pugetsoundkeeperalliance.org/enforcement/stormwater.html
Website for the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance, with a page on the stormwater
program affecting Puget Sound.
3. California Department of Transportation 
www.dot.ca.gov/hq/env/stormwater/
California’s Department of Transportation website.  Provides information on
California’s programs to reduce stormwater pollution, including bulletins, stud-
ies, and links.
4. National Association of Flood & Stormwater Management Agencies
www.nafsma.org
Website for National Association of Flood & Stormwater Management
Agencies, an organization of public agencies whose function is the protection
of lives, property, and economic activity from the adverse impacts of storm and
flood waters.
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